In this excerpt from Chapter 7 of his recent book Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes Under American Law (Harvard University Press, 1999), Professor Lawrence of Boston University considers the often controversial debate over the treatment in law of crimes motivated by racial hatred and the wider issue of punishment theory.
Before concluding, it is wise to step back from this assumption, to ask not merely whether it is justified to punish hate, but is it necessary to punish hate. A state may do so but should it? The question is clearer if not conceived as a choice between punishing bias crimes and not doing so. Were the choice truly this stark, the answer would be obvious and compelling. One of the arguments advanced for including sexual orientation in bias crime statutes, for example, is that assaults against gays and lesbians are notoriously under-investigated by the police and under-prosecuted by local district attorneys." (A similar argument is often made concerning laws aimed at domestic violence.) The obvious and compelling response to this situation is that 'gay bashing', like domestic violence, should be properly treated by the criminal justice system. The argument based on under-enforcement, however, does not support the conclusion that sexual orientation should be a bias crime, because it is based on a false choice or, better put, an incomplete choice. The choice between punishing gay bashing as a bias crime or not at all, omits
the option of properly handling these crimes as parallel assaults, without regard to the bias motivation. If these cases were investigated as carefully and prosecuted as vigorously as any other assault, then our concerns would be satisfied without the need to include sexual orientation in a bias crime law. One could argue that the inclusion ot sexual orientation in bias crime laws is the best way, or perhaps the only way, to improve the manner in which the criminal justice system responds to these crimes. If true, it represents a strong, fairly obvious, justification. But, to be tested properly, the 'Is it really worth it?' question must assume that the criminal justice system otherwise works or could be made to work. Is it really worth the acrimony that often accompanies the debates over bias crime laws, to prosecute these crimes as bias crimes?
There is one other tempting answer to 'Is it really worth it?' that ultimately fails. This answer argues that mere investigation and prosecution of bias crimes are not the only goals. For the reasons discussed in Chapter 3, bias crimes require not only punishment, but greater punishment than parallel crimes. One could argue that bias crime laws are worth it in order to obtain enhanced punishment of racially-motivated violence. There is, however, a softer means of achieving that end, one that would avoid the need to enact bias crime laws per se. Consider, for example, the manner in which the law treats racially-motivated violence in Great Britain. Other than the crime of incitement to racial hatred, a crime limited largely to distribution of racist pamphlets, and very difficult to prosecute, there is no specific crime for racially-motivated violence in the UK [but please see author's endnote concerning the provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, enacted after his manuscript went to press]. 111
In the case of a racially-motivated assault, however, British law enforcement officials may take the perpetrator's motivation into account in deciding whether to pursue the case, and the Court may similarly take motivation into account in determining the proper sentence. Enhanced punishment of bias crimes therefore exists, at least in theory, without the need for an expressed bias crime law. This brings us back to the question: 'Is it worth it?'
The answer is that it is well worthwhile to have laws that expressly punish racially-motivated violence. In order to see why, we must return to the general justifications for punishment, and now augment that discussion with a consideration of the expressive value of punishment or what is sometimes known as the denunciation theory of punishment.
The expressive value of punishment allows us to say not only that bias crime laws are warranted, they are essential. Without punishment, the collective moral consciousness could not be preserved. lx Durkheim's denunciation theory of punishment has been subject to two main strands of critique, one based in sociology and the other in punishment theory. The sociological critique questions the linkage, by sheer assertion, between law and moral consensus. There is no room for social conflict in a theory that posits a single collective consciousness that is expressed in the criminal law. x If we understand the criminal law to have been produced through social conflict, and not through the expression of a universal societal norm, then, according to this critique, denunciation loses much of its lustre as a justification for criminal punishment.
THE EXPRESSIVE VALUE OF PUNISHMENT
The punishment-theory critique questions the requirement, again by sheer assertion, that denunciation of the violation of social norms should proceed by criminal punishment of the wrongdoer. The denunciatory effect could be achieved in any number of means for example, public pronouncement by the head of state or a judge, or shooting off a cannon in the publicsquare so long as the convention is understood by the audience. That punishment is the proper convention requires an independent justification for punishment, a justification that denunciation itself does not provide. Denunciation thus cannot stand on its own as a theory of punishment and ultimately relies upon some other justification for its validity'.
Nigel Walker captured this critique well: 'denouncers are really either quasi-retributivists or crypto- [consequentialists] .'xl They are quasi-retributivists because the convention of punishment as the means to denounce makes sense only where the defendant deserves to be punished. Punishment without desert would leave the denunciation vague at best. Alternatively, thev are crypto-consequentialists because they justify punishment by the social utility that it produces. Unlike that of classic consequentialists, denouncers' utility comes in the form of social cohesion, not, strictly speaking, crime reduction. But it is a utility calculus nonetheless. xu Understood this way, Durkheim is seen not as a ground-breaker proposing a third approach to punishment theory, but rather as a utilitarian in the mould of those who advocated the educative theory of punishment such as Alfred Ewing and Bernard Bosanquet. x111
Both the sociological and punishment-theory critiques of the denunciation theory have merit. Neither calls for an abandonment of that theory, but each calls for its modification. The sociological critique is right to challenge the criminal law as some universal expression of the community's will. Such a wooden view of the law is inconsistent with all we have come to understand about the process by which legislation is created and law is made. xlv But we can relax this extreme view of the criminal law without doing serious violence to the fundamental usefulness of the expressive value of punishment. First, while it is certainly true that criminal laws do not receive unanimous support, there is a considerable social consensus underpinning the criminal law. Most criminal prohibitions, at least at a general level, derive widespread public support.^ Moreover, we would expect that this level of support would be even higher if we look to find, not those who believe that any particular criminal law or even principle of criminal law represents the moral view of the community, but those who believe that the rule of law generally
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O r epresents the moral view of the community. Those who believe both that a sufficient weight of the criminal law does reflect the community's sense, and that there is a basic legitimacy to the system that produces criminal law, would thus also believe that there is a moral weight to the criminal law generally, even to those specific laws with which they might happen to disagree.
Obedience to the law thus represents a moral value of a broad spectrum of the community.
Even so, there will never be unanimity as to the moral sense of the community and indeed there may be dispute as to whether there is a single 'community' that may have a single view. This too may be accommodated by the expressive view of punishment when we exchange the descriptive claim of universal consensus for a normative claim of what the community's values ought to be. Obviously, there will be dispute over the moral value of the criminal law. My argument, however, is two-fold. First, the areas of dispute are not as widespread as mav first be imagined all reasonable people will agree that, all things being equal, it is worse to kill than to injure, and that it is worse to cause unjustified harm purposefully than accidentally. Second, as to those areas of dispute, the stakes of the argument are not merely who ought to go to jail, but what the moral view of the community about such conduct should be.
The punishment-theory critique of Durkheim may also be accommodated in a means that yields a richer expressive theory of punishment. The punishment-theory critique properly contends that expressive theory is not a free-standing independent justification for punishment. As we saw in Chapter 3, however, much of the work in contemporary philosophy of punishment has concerned 'mixed theories' of punishment, drawing on aspects of both utilitarian and retributivist thought.
So long as expressive theory is not merely redundant with retributive or consequential arguments, it legitimately takes its place among these eclectic approaches. Feinberg argues that this punishment, as a means of demonstrating public non-acquiescence with the crime, is more symbolic and expressive than it is retributive." 111
Expressive theory also has a consequentialist aspect. However, we can distinguish those consequences that seek to reduce crime, whether by incapacitation, deterrence, or rehabilitation, from those consequences that announce values. The ultimate audience for punishment that seeks to reduce crime is composed of criminals and would-be criminals. The ultimate audience for punishment that seeks to announce values is composed of lawabiding citizens. X1X The utilitarian dimension of denunciation, therefore, looks to a greatly expanded set of considerations over those traditionally considered by consequentialist approaches to punishment.
Expressive punishment theory, although derivative of retributive and consequentialist theories of punishment, builds on these theories and expands our understanding of punishment. In the final analysis, the punishment-theory critique may simply miss the mark it criticises denunciation theory for failing to answer adequately a question that denunciation theory does not conceive to be central to its mission. Expressive theory may be concerned less with providing a full justification of punishment than with understanding the full impact of punishment. Indeed, Durkheim may well not have seen his project as one of justifying punishment, which he took to be a sociological fact of all cultures, but rather as one of investigating the role of punishment in advanced societies. xx Recognizing the expressive value of punishment, by itself, may provide limited help in answering the initial normative question as to whether society may punish its members. Once we answer that question affirmatively, however, societal denunciation must inform our decisions about the nature of that punishment.
THE EXPRESSIVE VALUE OF PUNISHING BIAS CRIMES
We may now return to the question we raised at the outset of this chapter: is it really worth it? Is it really worth the acrimony that often accompanies the debates over bias crime laws, to prosecute these crimes as bias crimes?
What happens when proposed bias crime legislation becomes law? This act of law-making constitutes a societal condemnation of racism, religious intolerance, and other forms of bigotry that are covered by that law. Moreover, every act of condemnation is dialectically twinning with an act of expression of values in Durkheim's terms social cohesion. Punishment not only signals the border between that which is permitted and that which is proscribed, but also denounces that which is rejected and announces that which is embraced. Because racial harmonv and equality are among the highest values held in our society, crimes that violate these values should be punished and must be punished specifically as bias crimes. Similarly, bias crimes must be punished more harshly than crimes that, although otherwise Thus far we have considered the enactment of a bias crime law to be a simple binary choice: a legislature enacts a bias crime law or it does not. To do so denounces racial hatred, and to fail to do so gives comfort to the racist. We can make a similar observation in the more subtle context of establishing grades of crimes and levels of criminal punishment. In Chapter 3, we discussed the ways in which both retributive and consequentialist theories of punishment embraced a concept of proportionality. Now we can see that expressive punishment theory does as well. Conduct that is more offensive to society should receive relatively greater punishment than that which is less offensive. We would be shocked if a legislature punished shoplifting equally with aggravated assault. We might disagree as to whether one was punished excessively or the other insufficiently, but we would agree that these crimes ought not to be treated identically. Society's most cherished values will be reflected in the criminal law by applying the harshest penalties to those crimes that violate these values. There will certainly be lesser penalties for those crimes that in some respects are similar but do not violate these values. The hierarchy of societal values involved in criminal conduct will thus be reflected by the lesser crime's status as a lesser included offence within the more serious crime.
The enshrinement of racial harmony and equality among our highest values not only calls for independent punishment of racially-motivated violence as a bias crime and not merely as a parallel crime; it also calls for enhanced punishment of bias crimes over parallel crimes. If bias crimes are not punished more harshly than parallel crimes, the implicit message expressed by the criminal justice system is that racial harmony and equality are not among the highest values in our society. If a raciallymotivated assault is punished identically to a parallel assault, the racial motivation of the bias crime is rendered largely irrelevant and thus not part of that which is condemned. The individual victim, the target community, and indeed the society at large thus suffers the twin insults akin to those suffered by the narrator of 
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